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The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.'
Justice McReynolds wrote these words for the U.S. Supreme Court in
1925, finding the First Amendment balances the authority of the state with
* Associate Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law. My thanks to Kevin
Saunders for his thoughtful kindness, to Dean Blackburn and Professor Catherine Dwyer for
their hospitality, and to the Michigan State Law Review for their helpful assistance during this
symposium.
1. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
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that of the parent over the teaching of a child.2 As the law has evolved in the
eight decades since, this balance has leaned ever more toward parental
freedom from state interference in the mental and social development of
children. Yet even as the balance has tilted toward the parent, the state retains
a duty to assist in preparing each child for the obligations of adulthood.3
Weighing the responsibilities in the two trays of this balance is hard.
Onto one tray go American ideals of individual autonomy, respect for family,
and a belief that every parent ought to provide to a child unique insights that
arise from religion and experience. That tray also carries a fear of state power
and thought control, whether described as values of individuality or pluralism
or values of limited government and the respect of privacy. It is heavily-
weighted with arguments for limits on the state and license for the parent.
The other tray in the balance is less noticeable in contemporary rhetoric.
American talk in the early years of the twenty-first century is increasingly
freighted with the language of rights and state-bashing. Yet on that tray are
the ideals of civic community-the common denominators of civic values of
tolerance and of shared history and identity. Also on that tray are the tools of
social skills and trades, the assurance of knowledge needed for employment,
and self-actualization.
The state and the parent are not the only forces that influence children.
There are, of course, the agents of commerce and culture, which vie with
parents for a child's attention. We must recognize not only that the ability of
a parent to fulfill the duty to "recognize and prepare" a child for the
obligations of adulthood, but also that the ability of the state to ensure the
rights of its citizens must either co-opt or compete with all of these influences,
or surrender to them. How, then, are parents to fulfill this duty, and what is
the state's obligation when they do not or cannot? Where, in the end, do the
pans of the balance rest?
2. See id. at 534-35. Pierce did not, of course, first establish individual fights against
the requirements of state education. That line was crossed two years earlier in Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923), in which a teacher's
right to teach the German language was recognized as an aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Pierce extended Meyer's and Bartel's logic to parental interests and school interests under the
First Amendment. Tying the bundle together, a teacher's fight to instruct languages was
recognized as a First Amendment right in Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
Interestingly, all of these opinions were by Justice James C. McReynolds, who is rarely thought
of as ajuggemaut of progressive opinion-writing. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A BOOK OF LEGAL
LISTS: THE BEST AND THE WORST IN AMERICAN LAW 34-36 (1997).
3. "There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for
education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic
education." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
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These are important and solemn questions, which may be why they are
so often captured in peripheral issues. An observer of American culture in
2004, observing the deployment of American federal institutions to assist
parents in preparing their children for adulthood, might conclude that the
greatest challenge facing American children was Janet Jackson's right breast.'
The arguments over the pervasive sexualization of television broadcast
content are a sub-set among a host of political, legal, and popular arguments
over the morality of the public in the United States. In Janet Jackson's case,
as in many of these arguments, a slurry of agendas competed: some of them
the commercial development of new and lucrative markets, some of them the
political rousing of the rabble to be used for other ends, but nearly all claiming
to speak for the children.' Certainly, some in the throng were parents with
genuine grievances, parents who had no desire to explain to their child why
that lady wore such funny jewelry. More, though, appeared to be holding
children aloft as banners in their personal fights, not for what would truly
harm children, but for what they object to in the public sphere because it
offends them personally.
There are, clearly, important debates about the moral climate and culture
in America. Children are a powerful icon supporting the rhetoric for all sides
of those debates: what influences one or another outcome will have on
children, how those children will be altered, for good or ill, and what
differences there will be among adults who grow from children altered in
these ways. These questions are more than raw data; they are the tropes of
political debate that can mask nearly every agenda affecting public discourse.
4. During the CBS network broadcast of the 2004 Super Bowl, popular music
performer Justin Timberlake opened the bustier ofperformer Janet Jackson, exposing her breast,
on which was a large, light-catching nipple-guard. See In re Complaints Against Various
Television Licensees Concerning Their February 1,2004, Broadcast oftheSuperBowlXXXVI
Halftime Show, 19 F.C.C.R. 19,230 (2004). According to the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), the agency received an "unprecedented number of complaints" that the
incident and the music performed prior to it were indecent. Id. The FCC held hearings and
levied a fine of $550,000, representing a $7,000 fine for every station owned by CBS's parent
company, Viacom. See id. Not content with the level of the fine, Congress soon after took up
debate on legislation that would increase such fines to as much as $3,000,000 per incident. See
Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004 (Amendment 3235 to the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005) 150 CONG. REC. S6980-82 (June 17, 2004); Broadcast
Decency Enforcement Act of 2005, 151 CONG. REC. H653-H664 (Feb. 16, 2005). Arguments
over the bill compared it as a "real value to American families" to a limitation on free speech
and democracy. Frank Ahrens, House Raises Penaltiesfor Airing Indecency, WASH. POST, Feb.
17, 2005, at E l.
5. Complaints in recent and pending proceedings before the FCC may be found at
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/broadcast/Plead.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
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I. THE WELFARE OF THE CHILD AS THE END OF THE ARGUMENT, NOT AS
THE MEANS
In this symposium, all of the debates are not covered, only those that
affect children and the rights of free expression considered under the First
Amendment. Within that broad rubric, though, are many debates which are
important both in themselves and as bellweathers of the broader storm of
issues. In common among them are claims by one side that some law is
required in the interests of children, and on the other that the law will violate
rights protected under the First Amendment. We are not, I take it, considering
arguments that would allow physical harm to the child to protect an adult's
rights. For instance, we are not considering seriously the arguments under the
Free Exercise Clause that a minor child may be denied support or medical
treatment because of a parent's religion.6 Thus, what is at issue here are laws
requiring or forbidding the exposure of children to ideas and values.
In other words, the claims are that the laws ought to either expose
children to or shelter them from certain ideas or values. At face value, in the
Janet Jackson case, the argument is that the law ought to shelter children from
such images, or from the information that people wave (or have waved) such
parts of their bodies in public. The counter-argument would be that, because
freedom of expression allows such information to be presented to the world,
either it must be appropriate for children to view it or, alternatively, that it is
appropriate for adults to view it and too difficult to keep it from children.
However, there are other arguments in the Janet Jackson case, arguments
that are less persuasive but more likely to inspire their proponents into the
fray. Some adults are offended by seeing a woman's bare breast in public.
Some companies can make a lot of money by having it waved around. These
arguments are rarely made directly but are likely to be cloaked in the more
public-spirited claims and counterclaims about children.
If we are to comprehensively examine the legal and social environment
that we ought to create for children, we might begin by evaluating the rhetoric
about children's interests. A preliminary task is to separate authentic
arguments made on behalf of children from the many claims of promoting
children's interests that mask alternate agendas. It might seem obvious that
6. There are, to be sure, those who argue that even the physical welfare of the child
is subordinate to the parent's religious views regarding the best manner to promote that welfare.
This argument is an extreme variant on some considered here, but it is otherwise beyond the
scope of the present discussion. In general, the physical well-being of the child is always
paramount to religious claims, and the state has the duty to protect children from neglect on
religious grounds. See, e.g., People v. Rippberger, 283 Cal. Rptr. I I I (Ct. App. 1991).
[Vol. 2005:809
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one can reject arguments where the asserted reason for demanding some
policy or law is child welfare but which is actually a sham for advancing the
interest of a parent, a corporation, or a government. Such a rejection echoes
the moral treatment required by the great ethical theorist Immanuel Kant, that
one of the fundamental notions of morality is to treat each person as an end
and not as a means.7 Besides the moral caution such arguments raise, there is
also a sense in which such arguments deceive others and are likely to distort
considerations of the child's real interests.
Practically though, merely sorting arguments in which the child's interest
is distinct from the interests of others is often very hard. The underlying
argument for the adult interest is usually too deeply intertwined with the cover
argument about the child's benefit. How, for instance, can one separate the
child's interest from the parent's interest in a parent's demand to raise the
child in the parent's religious tradition? There is an allure to segregating sham
arguments from authentic arguments over the welfare of children, but such
arguments are complex, combining interests from which such a segregation
is unlikely to be generally useful. We are therefore likely to fail to sort out all
of the arguments in which children are the means for advancing an underlying
agenda from those in which the welfare of children is the true end of the
argument.
One measure of the authenticity of a specific argument is the likelihood
it promotes no other interests but the child's. When a corporation advertising
on Channel One argues that it is in the child's interest to see educational
programming in schools, an observer is entitled to discount the argument
according to the independent motives of the speaker.' It remains difficult,
though, to distinguish the authentic voice between parent and child. For
example, when a seventh-grade son and his father seek to exempt the son from
health education on religious grounds,9 the son may have a sincere religious
belief, which, regardless of his learning it from his father, is now his own.
7. "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other,
in every case as an end withal, never as means only." IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 58 (Thomas K. Abbott, trans., Prometheus
Books 1987).
8. Channel One is a commercial television feed given to schools free and subsidized
by advertisements. See Channel One, http://www.channelone.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
It claims to reach 12,000 middle, junior, and high schools in the U.S., or over 8 million students
daily. See id. A visit to its website suggested primary sponsors at that time were Wrigley gum
and Neutrogena skin care products. See id.
9. See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003) (asserting a free
exercise burden upon both father and seventh-grade son by the son's requirement to attend
public-school health education class, even though the son was not required to attend classes on
sex and AIDS).
Fall]
Michigan State Law Review
Further, the father's belief that he is religiously obliged to be the sole source
of his son's knowledge may be perfectly sincere.
Of course, we are not limited to the descriptions of interests made by
those who are engaged in a particular debate. While we have an obligation to
take seriously and fairly the issues raised, we may use objective tools to fairly
evaluate and restate the interests at issue.1
0
In the case of the nature of a child's education, one tool by which one
might sort arguments would be to reject, presumptively, all arguments that
commence from models of negative influence on children." That is to say, we
might expect that arguments to keep a child in some forms of ignorance are
more suspect than arguments to promote some forms of awareness.
Presently, negative models are our stock-in-trade. They drive our ideas
and notions of child protection, of obscenity, and as my colleague Mark
Kende demonstrates in this symposium, the algorithms of Internet filters. 2
Yet because negative models, at best, can demonstrate what the child ought
not know or believe, they do not lead to a comprehensible ideal of the
intellectual development of a child. The negative models we have are
independent of one another, and at least in regard to speech and ideas, for
most people, unprioritized, leading to a concentration on negative models that
may not be as harmful to the child as other negative influences.
The skewed priority of negative models is particularly apparent in the
great effort to create and maintain legal barriers between children and
depictions of sex, when at the same time children are exposed to near-
relentless depictions of violence. 3 The arguments to keep children from
exposure to sex fascinate Americans in a way that arguments to keep children
10. This is objective evaluation in the senses of fair and disinterested scrutiny, not in
the sense of attempting to define some ultimate objective sense in which one is right or good.
The exploration in this article is based on reason in the political realm, not the metaphysical.
For those who prefer to fight over the moral reality of their beliefs, see JEREMY WALDRON, The
Irrelevance of Objectivity, in JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 164-87 (2001).
11. To be clear, this is not to say that all negative models of a child would presumbably
be inauthentic. Negative models that would keep a child from hunger, violence, or fear are
fundamental means of expressing important goals that, obviously, are authentically in the
interests of the child. True, these goals can be expressed in affirmative rhetoric, such as the
models of a child with constant access to good nutrition, safety, and comfort. But the
fundamental and uncontroversial nature of these interests suggests that neither the negative nor
the positive model is likely to be asserted in an inauthentic attempt to promote an ulterior
agenda. The nature of the interests in the ideas to which a child is exposed are not so
uncontroversial.
12. See Mark S. Kende, Filtering Out Children: The First Amendment and Internet
Porn in the U.S. Supreme Court, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 843.
13. This problem is addressed best in KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE AS OBSCENITY:
LIMITING THE MEDIA'S FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION (1996).
(Vol, 2005:809
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from violence apparently do not. Parents who would not allow a twelve-year-
old to watch a movie depicting a nude adult think nothing of allowing the
child to see movies with graphic murders. 4 Such comparisons are usually the
product of unthinking observation, which turn on a structure of purely
negative models of the child: For many parents, the model "a child should not
be exposed to sex" is a higher-value model than "a child should not be
exposed to violence."
I believe that a healthier debate, in which authentic arguments over the
welfare of the child would be best presented, is one in which we presume that
the best arguments about children's proper knowledge and values should
commence from affirmative arguments of what a child ought to know. In
cultural iconography, it is the difference between arguing for appropriate role
models versus arguing against inappropriate models.
Affirmative arguments are more likely, as a practical matter, to treat the
child as the end of the argument, rather than the means to promote another
agenda. Affirmative arguments are less likely to be sham claims of the
interests of the child asserted in support of an underlying and independent
agenda. It is, of course, possible to promote other agendas through affirmative
role models. Yet the requirement to articulate the aspects of an appropriate
model expose the proponent to criticism more easily than the mere rejection
of another might do. In other words, to reject an idea as "indecent" is simply
easier and less rigorous than to support an idea as "decent." One can ask why
an idea is decent and expect an articulable and debatable answer, an
expectation less likely to be fulfilled for a claim of indecency. 5
Preferring affirmative arguments for the knowledge or values of the-child
over arguments based on isolation from images or ideas, is not merely a step
in the improvement of political rhetoric. It is also a means for locating the
argument in a clearer rationale for state regulation. It is an argument
according to which lawmakers can discern the rationale at stake in making and
enforcing laws.
Seen in this light, there is a framework for further evaluation. The
literature of legal perfectionism provides a method for evaluating laws that
14. 1 take this impression from an interview conducted with Mr. Mike Earls, the owner
of Take 2 video outlets in Fayetteville, Arkansas. See Community Standards for Obscenity
Round Table Discussion (Fayetteville, Ark. Cmty. Access Television broadcast July 24,2005).
His impression strikes me as being common across the United States.
15. Complaints, for instance, to the FCC in the Janet Jackson incident needed merely
to describe the offending broadcast and then to assert that the broadcast content was offensive
or indecent to the complainant, and that the complainant believes that the content is offensive
or indecent by the standards in the complainant's community. See In re Complaints, supra note
4. See also 47 C.F.R §73.3999 (2005) (barring radio and television stations from the broadcast
of obscene or indecent matter). As of 2005, no similar rule bars the broadcast of violent matter.
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promote "the good," whether it is a notion of the good that is manifest in the
life of an adult or in the life of a child.
H1. LEGAL PERFECTIONISM: THE OBLIGATION OF THE OFFICIAL TO
PROMOTE THE GOOD FOR CHILDREN, REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE LIBERALS,
CONSERVATIVES, AND LIBERTARIANS SAY
"Perfectionism" is a term in the philosophy of law that describes a
doctrine for the justification of law, as well as a theory by which laws may be
criticized in the light of that doctrine. According to the doctrine of
perfectionism, it is appropriate for laws to be created and enforced for the
purpose of promoting the good in the lives of citizens. 6 It follows that one
duty allocated among all officials is to create and enforce laws for that
purpose.' 7
As conceived in this doctrine, perfectionism does not entail any one
conception of the good. Officials are to debate and define them. It is clear
that, over time, some officials will enact conceptions that are dangerous and
wrong-headed, and, at other times, will enact conceptions that are beneficial
and wise. The debate over the good is ongoing. Even ideas whole-heartedly
accepted today and enshrined by law, such as the good of freedom from
slavery, must sometimes be argued and defended by the people who cherish
such ideas.
A full-throated defense of the doctrine of legal perfectionism is beyond
the scope of this article. Although the arguments against it are robust, and
some of them are popular at the moment, this paper will only offer a brief
rendition of each and a short argument for its rejection, at least as it would
ostensibly apply to children.
There are counter-perfectionist positions within liberal, conservative,
and libertarian positions, all of which, at first blush, appear to share a common
16. Stated more particularly,
[t]he doctrine is based on four [broad] assertions:
(I ) Some forms of life are better than others.
(2) It is possible to judge some of the conditions that constitute a good life.
(3) The law can assist in making lives good.
(4) Neither individual lawmakers nor the institutions of law are morally excluded from
attempting to make or enforce laws that fulfill such a role.
Steve Sheppard, The State Interest in the Good Citizen: Constitutional Balance Between the
Citizen and the Perfectionist State, 45 HASTINGS L. J. 969, 1013 (1994). Each of these
assertions is controversial. As conceived in this doctrine, perfectionism does not entail any
conception of the good. Officials and citizens are to debate and define them.
17. The idea of the officials' duty to promote this morality is developed further in
STEVE SHEPPARD, THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF LEGAL OFFICIALS (forthcoming 2006).
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thread in claiming that the state's promotion of any one model of the good
would be impermissible as a limit on the freedom of citizens.
The liberal argument is that the state has an obligation to remain neutral
on competing views of the good. If one person chooses to devote a life to
pushpin and another to ecology, both are equally valid to them, and the state
has no business interfering. 8
The modem archetype of the liberal position is that of the neo-Kantian
John Rawls, whose view is autonomy of the individual in a limited society
(and thus the state) that does not interfere with individual choices, except to
the degree necessary to ensure that each person has the degree of freedom
consonant with the exercise of freedom by every other person. 9 Rawls does
18. The illustration comes from VINIT HAKSAR, EQUALITY, LIBERTY AND
PERFECTIONISM (1979). Haksar, of course, draws from Bentham's famous argument for utility
being based on the pleasure an activity provides its participants:
Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of
music and poetry. If the game of push-pin furnish more pleasure, it is more valuable
than either.... If poetry and music deserve to be preferred before a game of push-pin,
it must be because they are calculated to gratify those individuals who are most
difficult to be pleased.
JEREMY BENTHAM, The Rationale of Reward, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 189,
253-54 (Bowring ed., William Tait 1843) (1825). Push-pin, incidentally, was a game known
at least from Elizabethan times, something between modem American marbles and pick-up-
sticks, in which children pushed or tossed pins, winning them by crossing an opponent's pin.
See T. F. THISELTON DYER, FOLK-LORE OFSHAKESPEARE 415 (N.Y., Harper & Brothers 1884).
It was referred to as an illustration of childish games by both Shakespeare and, though more as
a metaphor of adult repartee, by Swift. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, LOVE'S LABOUR LOST act
4, Sc. 3; JONATHAN SwIFT, Polite Conversation in Three Dialogues, I I THE PROSE WORKS OF
JONATHAN SwIFT, D.D. 233 (Temple Scott ed., AMS Press 1971) (1907).
Of course, utilitarianism does not entail neutrality, and J.S. Mill accepted the bulk of
Bentham's argument for legal utility, while rejecting neutrality in assessing the bases for
happiness. See, JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Longmans, Green, and Co., 1901)
(1861).
The concept ofneutrality is more thoroughly developed by its contemporary proponents. See,
e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10(1980); RONALD DWORKIN,
A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 222 (1985).
19. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1995). Rawls' view is the most
interesting regarding perfectionism, as he specifically pits his view of liberal neutrality,
excepting certain basic ideas in a thin "theory of the good" from all other potentially
idiosyncratic notions ofthe good, against a caricatured ideal ofperfectionism. See id. at 292-95.
Although he claims his theory of the just social order is superior to a more moderate form of
perfectionism, he never really says how or why, nor does he account for the perfectionist aspect
of his own theory. See Steve Sheppard, The Perfectionisms of John Rawls, I I CAN. J.L. &
JURIS. 383 (1998).
Of course, as with each of these terms, "liberalism" stands for a cluster of competing ideas.
All that seems to link many views of liberalism is a trust in rationality to establish the standards
for personal freedom, at which point it stands for little different than does conservatism. For
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not, however, deal prominently with the problem of the freedom of the child
or attempt to define the degree of independence of the interests of children
from their parents." Even so, while arguing that his theory's requirement is
less comprehensive than Mill's, he ultimately requires more for a child's
minimum education than Mill did, arguing that the child not only must be
prepared for self-sufficiency, but also taught the legal allowances of political
liberalism.2
the purpose of this discussion, the most important liberal argument regarding education, based
on a framework independent of Rawls', is Rousseau's famous depiction of the best education
as minimizing book-learning to prevent the corruption of youth, which in turn prevents the
corruption of civil society. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE OU DE L'EDUCATION, reprinted
in EMILE OR, ON EDUCATION (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books 1979) (1762). For the
continuing influence of Rousseau's idea, see JOHN E.M. DARLING, CHILD-CENTERED
EDUCATION AND ITS CRITICS (1993).
20. See RAWLS, supra note 19, at 199-200, Rawls' failure to develop these theories, or
his failure to provide a sufficient obligation to teach children the values of his liberal state, have
been the basis for criticism by feminist theorists. See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, Political
Liberalism, Justice, and Gender, 105 ETHICS23, 23-43 (1994); S.A. Lloyd, Situatinga Feminist
Criticism of John Rawls's Political Liberalism, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1319 (1995).
21. In his last restatement of his theory, Rawls elaborates the limits of comprehensive
liberalism and distinguishes them from political liberalism, as they apply to the education of
children. Yet, the breadth of education required may fairly be read to be more extensive than
that required by Mill, at least in his essay on liberalism to which Rawls compares himself. His
discussion is worth considering in full:
The liberalisms of Kant and Mill may lead to requirements designed to foster the
values of autonomy and individuality as ideals to govern much if not all of life. But
political liberalism has a different aim and requires far less. It will ask that children's
education include such things as knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights,
so that, for example, they know that liberty of conscience exists in their society and
that apostasy is not a legal crime, all this to ensure that their continued religious
membership when they come of age is not based simply on ignorance of their basic
rights or fear of punishment for offenses that are only considered offenses within their
religious sect. Their education should also prepare them to be fully cooperating
members of society and enable them to be self-supporting; it should also encourage
the political virtues so that they want to honor the fair terms of social cooperation in
their relations with the rest of society.
JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 156 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001). Compare,
however, this list to the more restrictive list of skills or values that Mill would require, quoted
in supra note 18, at 10-17.
While Rawls objects that his theory would not educate children in "a comprehensive liberal
conception," he does allow that, at least for some children, educating them in the political
conception may in fact lead to educating them in a comprehensive conception. To an extent,
Rawls admits that his theory does not forbid some congruence with preferring some forms of
life over others, only that such a preference, when made for grounds other than those of political
liberalism, is no longer politically liberal. RAWLS, supra note 21, at 156-57.
[Vol. 2005: 809
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This article cannot go far down the Rawlsian road, and for now it will
assert only that Rawls' glancing rejection of a more robust theory of liberal
education is untenable. Unless individuals have a personal commitment to his
enterprise of tolerance and social justice, it is highly unlikely that a state that
governs them, or that a society that comprises them, will have such a
commitment. Rawls wants to have his cake and eat it too. Whatever the
theory, for the liberal enterprise ever to be implemented requires a personal
commitment to liberal ideals. As Mill understood, and Rawls nearly agrees,
this commitment is likely to be founded in education.22
One broad statement of the conservative view is that the state is
inherently limited in its power by its historical and constitutional functions,
which are limited from interfering in personal choices, for a variety of reasons.
Chief among these is the promotion of the greatest degree of self-reliance and
rational autonomy, although different theorists would also promote other
values, such as commerce or virtue. Conservatism is a family of often warring
doctrines, and one might broadly divide conservatives into classical liberals
and traditional conservatives.
Classical liberals, some of whom are libertarians, embrace a form of
neutrality not unlike that of liberal neutrality. The leading case for the
classical-liberal form of conservatism is probably Robert Nozick's, who
argues for the neutrality of the "night watchman state," which leaves to
individuals the power to decide how to allocate their resources and their
choice of the good.23 Yet, the classical-liberal argument requires individuals
to be capable of exercising autonomous choice, which in turn requires some
preparation to make such choices .24 The classical-liberal view refuses to allow
the state a role in making such choices, trusting the competition among
competing providers of education to lead to the best results.25 Indeed, even
22. One of the best extended defenses of a robust agenda for the education of civic
responsibility, that respects pluralism and at least some forms of liberal neutrality, is in EAMONN
CALLAN, CREATING CITIZENS: POLITICAL EDUCATION AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1997). Even
so, the gold standard for balancing the need to ensure at least a minimal content of civic
education with a principled argument for a more robust education of the skills and virtues of
democratic deliberation is AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (2d ed. 1999).
23. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 272 (1974). There is a wonderful
irony in that Nozick's argument for autonomy was centered in a long-standing tradition of
libertarian and anarchic writing. See, e.g., WILLIAM GODWIN, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING
POLITICAL JUSTICE AND ITS INFLUENCE ON MODERN MORALS AND HAPPINESS (Viking Press
1993) (1793).
24. See Nozick, supra note 23, at 242. "in some way it must be ensured that [children]
are informed of the range of alternatives in the world." Id.
25. See JOHN GRAY, HAYEK ON LIBERTY 77-78 (1998). Of course, the forms that are
best may be various and competing, and in this sense, the best promoted by Hayek, Nozick, and
Gray is quite different from any perfectionist best. Still, a core value of the best education
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radical libertarian critiques of public education would not do away with a
required regime of education but would instead substitute radicalizing forms
for the present curriculum that supports nationalism, employer subservience,
and conformity.26 Thus, although classical liberalism and its more radical
alternatives would minimize the state's role in education, the literature central
to these fields still accepts some form of education as essential, and some
content as best.
It might seem that the traditional conservative shares this neutrality,
given the recurring conservative fear of "big government."" This is not
necessarily so. Traditional conservatism is openly anti-neutral, embracing a
view of the person based on a naturalist conception of humanity, which can
be promoted as a form of the good by the state.2" The leading cases for the
traditional conservative view are, from a naturalist perspective, John
Finnis's,29 and from a political perspective, Michael Oakeshott's." A nice
synthesis of these approaches is given by the popular conservative writer
George F. Will, who believes that conservatism seeks an equilibrium between
politics and the natural aspects of humankind.
[N]ature has political claims and that nurturing has a political role. Nature's political
claims rise from this fact: The idea of human nature involves the idea of essential
remains that requires the knowledge to see alternatives and skill to manifest them.
26. See, e.g., JOEL SPRING, A PRIMER OF LIBERTARIAN EDUCATION (1998).
27. George F. Will, The Cultural Contradictions of Conservatism, 123 PUB. INT. 40
(1996). On Will's place as the American Tory in the conservative pantheon of the United
States, see MARKJ. ROZELL& JAMES F. PONTUSO, AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE OPINION LEADERS
13(1990).
28. Such forms of conservatism, more akin to Amitai Etzioni's communitarianism, are
compatible with some forms of perfectionism, and some are rather unappealing to many
contemporary readers, such Lord Devlin's. See PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF
MORALS (Oxford Univ. Press 1996). The difference is that perfectionism does not limit the
debate of the good to any ideas that were embraced by a culture in the past. Perfectionism can
embrace arguments both that a given notion of the good is false, and that, even if a notion of the
good is correct it would be improvident of the state to attempt to promote it and do other
damage more severe. See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1972).
29. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). No doubt Finnis
would be troubled by the label of conservatism, as he is justly skeptical of all such "unstable and
parasitic academic categories." John Finnis, On the Incoherence ofLegal Positivism, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1597, 1597 (2000). Even so, if one defines conservatism to include those
theories that recognize and promote a concept of the person based on natural understandings
of basic goods, one has to include his theory within conservatism. I am not, of course, the first
to call Finnis a conservative. See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative
Mind, 84 GEO. L.J. 261 (1995).
30. MICHAELOAKESHOTT, ON HUMAN CONDUCT (1991). Oakeshott's concept of civic
association, which he describes as "moral and not instrumental," is considered in On the Civil
Condition, which is the second essay. Id. at 108.
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human qualities or virtues that are conducive to excellence. And the task of political
nurturing takes its bearings from that idea of excellence.
3 1
This equilibrium requires the identification of the moral and the natural
good, and it requires education to prepare individuals to pursue their lives
accordingly. Oakeshott particularly recognizes moral education, particularly
in higher education, as a precondition of proper civic associations.32 It would
appear that Finnis does too.
33
Such a naturalist conception of the person, and of the good, allows for
at least some laws to be justified on perfectionist grounds, although it does not
follow that all laws that might promote naturalist goods are justified by
naturalism or perfectionism. Coercive laws are much more difficult to justify
for most naturalists,34 and perfectionism requires not only that the naturalist
good be comprehensible but also that it be able to be efficaciously pursued by
law without offending more significant legal or constitutional doctrines. Still,
naturalism would justify some perfectionist laws, and it is likely that laws
requiring children to learn basic goods would be justified.
I would not suggest that all liberals, conservatives, or libertarians accept
some notion of perfectionism toward children.35 I merely hope to show in this
brief review that the general arguments of legal theory that generally would
restrict the state from perfectionism do not apply to a basic education of
31. George F. Will, supra note 27, at 46.
32. Michael Oakeshott, Political Education, in MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, THE VOICE OF
LIBERAL LEARNING (Timothy Fuller ed., 2001). See also David McCabe, Michael Oakeshott
and the Idea of Liberal Education, 26 Soc. THEORY AND PRAC. 443 (2000). Oakeshott is by
no means unusual. The central voice in the conservative literature of education is probably
Cardinal Newman's argument for the improvement of each person's mind as an end in itself.
Newman argued for "liberal education" in which each person would be trained with mental
discipline for its own sake, rather than for some trade, discipline, or profession. JOHN HENRY
CARDINAL NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY, DEFINED AND ILLUSTRATED 151-53 (1927).
Newman's view influenced or was strongly endorsed by conservatives in the United States. See,
e.g., RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND FROM BURKE TO ELIOT 254-55 (6th ed. 1978).
33. Finnis's theory implies that a role for both the state and society may be essential,
as he put it in another context, "to educate children and young people in virtue and to
discourage their vices." John Finnis, Liberalism and Natural Law Theory, 45 MERCER L. REV.
687, 697 (1994). Although, as Jeremy Waldron has made quite evident, his theory can embrace
opposing means ofachieving it, at least as an aspect of Finnis's view ofdistributivejustice. See
Jeremy Waldron, Lex Satis lusta, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1829, 1842-44 (2000).
34. See Finnis, Liberalism, supra note 33, at 687.
35. Indeed, John Rawls would argue that his limits on education prove that he has at
most an incidental perfectionist aspect to politically liberal education, and any reader is free to
read the degree that argument truly differs from a notion of a politically chosen, but nonetheless
robust, idea of the good to be promoted for each child. See supra notes 19-21 and
accompanying text.
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children to at least equip them to engage in civic life. This general review
would also suggest that, whether or not one is persuaded to accept a
perfectionist justification for law generally, a distinct question arises in
considering the perfectionist law as applied to benefit children. The
implication of the writings of the most keenly anti-perfectionist legal theorists
does not appear to answer that question in a way to bar the state from at least
some forms of laws that promote the good for children.
Whether or not one accepts this conclusion as appropriate in itself or
owing to its compatibility with otherwise anti-perfectionist theory, it would
seem that at least a prima facie case can be establish that some forms of
perfectionist arguments may justify the promotion of some forms of the good
in a child.36
The application of this idea to criticize laws, or a particular law, is
possible through the theory of legal perfectionism:
(1) Particular form of life X is good.37
(2) We know that this is so for reasons that can be communicated
between individuals.
(3) X can be efficaciously encouraged through the operation of a
particular law.
(4) The means employed by this law are compatible with other elements
of the legal system that are of equal or greater concern to lawmakers as
the form of life in question.38
36. One might reformulate the general doctrine of perfectionism with these
modifications:
(1) Some forms of life and development are better for a child than others.
(2) It is possible to judge some of the conditions that constitute what is good in this
life and development.
(3) The law can assist in making the lives of children good and promoting better
forms of development.
(4) Neither individual lawmakers nor the institutions of law are morally excluded
from attempting to make or enforce laws that fulfill such a role for children.
Claim (3) of the doctrine is not being given the detail of argument it deserves here, although to
some degree it resonates with the arguments of Ian Shapiro discussed below. See infra Part IV.
For the present purposes, I might recommend the lucid arguments to underpin the obligations
of both parents and other adults (as well as the state) to assist children in Gregory A. Loken,
Gratitude and the Map of Moral Duties Toward Children, 31 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1121 (1999).
37. There is nothing inherent in legal perfectionism that requires the theory to be framed
in an affirmative manner. It could be as easily formulated from the doctrine by rejecting form
of life X, for reasons that are articulable, with available law that might discourage it, that can
be enacted without conflicting with higher values in the legal system. It is put in the affirmative
here both for convenience and compatibility with the argument made infra Part Ill.
38. Higher values might include values that compete directly with the means chosen for
implementing the good for the child. Thus, it is quite possible that a higher value of respecting
a parent's religious exercise may be argued to impose an obligation to require a child to be
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The forms of life include forms of both action and thought, or engaging in
actions and projects as well as ideas and values. In the case of a child, the
good forms of life may be defined by the development of the child, so that the
educative nature of a child's development may limit the benefit of certain
actions or thoughts at one age that would be less limited at a later age.39
A defining aspect of a perfectionist approach is that it is only
coincidentally paternal. In other words, the good of the child is pursued
because it is the best thing to do, not merely because it is in the interest of the
child.4" The good is promoted for the benefit of both the individual and all
others, because each person interacts with one another, and the failure of one
person to perceive the good will cause hardships on others.
This form of perfectionism is akin to Robert George's idea in current
legal theory: moral ecology. Moral ecology is a nice shorthand term for the
sets of norms in a community that are the public consequences of private and
public actions, from which every person in the community learns what is
compelled to accept that religion when it conflicts with a state-recognized ideal of the good,
such as that children are taught tolerance for other religions. This problem is explored in greater
detail below, but is raised here to demonstrate the contentious nature of the analysis. The
resolution is not dependent on the theoretical structure but on the manner by which officials
engage in these ideas. An official must choose which value will trump.
39. This is not to suggest that childhood necessarily requires a thin version of morality
or a limited concept of responsibility. Certainly, the antecedents of current American culture
exposed children to mature situations and obligations at a younger age. See COLIN HEYWOOD,
A HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD: CHILDREN AND CHILDHOOD IN THE WEST FROM MEDIEVAL TO
MODERN TIMES (2001); HUGH CUNNINGHAM, CHILDREN AND CHILDHOOD IN WESTERN SOCIETY
SINCE 1500 (1995). For the idea that the notion of a naive and protected childhood has been
limited predominately to the white middle class in America, see STEVEN MINTZ, HUCK'S RAFT:
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CHILDHOOD (2004).
40. The great liberal utilitarian theorist John Stuart Mill argued that "one of the most
sacred duties of the parents" was not only to prepare a child to perform self-regarding duties but
other-regarding duties as well: "to give to that being an education fitting him to perform his part
well in life towards others and towards himself." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 189 (N.Y.,
J.B. Alden, 1885) (1859). Indeed, Mill was highly critical of English law, which then allowed
parents license in how or whether to educate a child, to the peril not only of the child but also
of society.
But while this is unanimously declared to be the father's duty, scarcely anybody, in
this country, will bear to hear of obliging him to perform it. Instead of his being
required to make any exertion or sacrifice for securing education to his child, it is left
to his choice to accept it or not when it is provided gratis! It still remains
unrecognized, that to bring a child into existence without a fair prospect of being able,
not only to provide food for its body, but instruction and training for its mind, is a
moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and against society; and that if the
parent does not fulfil this obligation, the State ought to see it fulfilled, at the charge,
as far as possible, of the parent.
Id. at 176.
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accepted as moral in that community.4' Moral ecology is, in essence, the basis
of the common sense of a society, the shared understanding of what is to be
done in any given situation.42 George develops his theory to justify laws that
develop healthy, rational, and moral rules in a community's ecology, 43 and yet
this notion provides a potentially useful tool in considering the collective view
as it affects an individual's view of the good, whether seen as its promotion
or the rejection of its converse.
41. See ROBERT GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC
MORALITY (1993); ROBERT GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW (1999); Robert P. George,
The Concept of Public Morality, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 17 (2000). See also MICHAEL NOVAK, ON
CULTIVATING LIBERTY: REFLECTIONS ON MORAL ECOLOGY (Brian C. Anderson ed., 1999).
Further development of this idea, particularly in the context of competing nations, is in Steve
Sheppard, Passion and Nation: War, Crime, and Guilt in the Individual and the Collective, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 751, 777-80 (2003), from which part of the argument in this paragraph
is derived.
42. Seen in this way, moral ecology echoes an aspect of Burkean conservatism, nicely
described as "social knowledge" by the conservative writer Roger Scruton in describing the
obstacle to a single agenda of reform by the likes of Rousseau.
By social knowledge, I mean the kind of knowledge embodied in the common law,
in parliamentary procedures, in manners, costume, social convention, and, also, in
morality. Such knowledge arises "by an invisible hand" from the open-ended
business of society, from problems that have been confronted and solved, from
agreements that have been perpetuated by custom, from conventions that coordinate
our otherwise conflicting passions, and from the unending process of negotiation and
compromise whereby we quieten the dogs of war.
Roger Scruton, Rousseau & the Origins of Liberalism, 17 NEW CRITERION 5 (1998).
43. George's theory is built on the Thomist foundations developed by John Finnis.
"[P]olitical authority legitimately extends even to the regulation, within limits, 'of friendships,
marriage, families, and religious associations, as well as all the many organizations and
associations which, like the state itself, have only an instrumental common good."' Robert
George, The Concept of Public Morality, supra note 41, at 29 (quoting John Finnis, Is Natural
Law Theory Compatible with Limited Government?, in ROBERT P. GEORGE, NATURAL LAW,
LIBERALISM, AND MORALITY 5 (1996)). The only limit of this extent is state obligation to secure
the social conditions of the well-being both for individuals and for their communities. Finnis
would limit the state from regulating private and secret relations, a limit George rejects. See id.
Obviously, George's approach has much in common with Amitai Etzioni's communitarianism,
although it is oddly uncommon for the literature critiquing legal moralism or legal perfectionism
to consider the interplay with Etzioni's communitarian writings, although Selzinck is more often
encountered in such venues. For exceptions, see Linda C. McClain, Toleration, Autonomy, and
Go vernmental Promotion ofGood Lives: Beyond "Empty" Toleration to Toleration as Respect,
59 OHIO ST. L.J. 19 (1998), and WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN
INTRODUCTION (1990).
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III. PREFERRING AFFIRMATIVE MODELS OF THE PERFECTIONIST GOOD,
ESPECIALLY WHEN THE GOOD IS PROMOTED FOR CHILDREN
The perfectionist models so far developed tend to allow either a negative
or an affirmative model of the good that could be the basis for thejustification
of laws and for the adoption of particular laws." Moral ecology, too, can be
framed by what is promoted or what is forbidden in a given society, and this
would seem at first to also be true for children.
Indeed, faced with competing visions of what is good and right, several
modem philosophers have counseled that it is more appropriate, or at least
easier, for philosophers and officials to pursue injustice than to promote
justice.45 More utopian writers continue to argue for a model of justice.46
These arguments for the good or the right generally suffer somewhat
when one alters the degree of abstraction. When considering whether it is
right for a child to learn, or it is right for a child to remain illiterate, there is
little dissension. When the argument is made more concrete, such as whether
it is right for a child to learn to desire a toy by brand, controversy is more
likely.
The questions posed by the doctrine of legal perfectionism are at a very
practical level. "What is good" here requires that the answer be one in which
ideas or actions affecting a child's life be determined by laws that must be
sufficiently specific in their edict that a person would understand what is
44. Both Finnis and Raz, however, have presented theories that suggest a preference
for affirmative rather than negative approaches to perfectionist rules. See Finnis, Liberalism,
supra note 33; JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986). Both advance their arguments
for affirmative rules on the basis of protecting freedom, rather than on these more instrumental
bases for determining the good and implementing it.
45. Most recently, this idea is associated with Stuart Hampshire. His pluralist model
of justice recognizes that competing moral visions of the best society lead to nearly hopeless
conflicts, which can only be resolved by looking for areas of common agreement, which are
more likely to be found in the institutions that lead through deliberation with respect to all sides
of an argument to agreement, and these institutions are most likely to agree on claims to rid
society of great ills. See, e.g., STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT (1999); STUART
HAMPSHIRE, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY (1978). The idea that a sense of injustice is more
valuable than a model of justice to create a just legal system is central also to the work of
Edmund Cahn. See EDMUND CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1949). Related to these uses of
injustice is my own view that many decisions of legal officials are best made by discounting the
most unjust outcomes first, allowing then a decision to accept the least unjust outcome. See
STEVE SHEPPARD, THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF LEGAL OFFICIALS (forthcoming 2007). None
of these three theories suggests that there are not models of the good or the right, only that in
choosing among them or in implementing them, circumstances affecting the choice may require
selection by criteria or injustice or avoiding the least wrong or least bad result.
46. See, e.g., RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 21.
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required. The understanding must be of the actions demanded or forbidden
in order for the law to be effective, and also that the moral notion promoted
by the demand be discernable in order for the perfectionist basis of the law to
be achieved.47 This is a level of rhetoric that is much less abstract; by
necessity it must deal with specific bases for making decisions regarding not
just education but specific aspects of curricula, not just values but specific
actions that lead to individual values.
At this level of political rhetoric, certain notions of what is good for a
child could still be described or promoted either by a negative or by an
affirmative description, and while either will be controversial, as considered
above, it seems likely as an empirical claim that the affirmative description
has a higher likelihood of authenticity." Preferring affirmative claims to
negative claims has other benefits as well.
For example, consider the effect of American children becoming
greedier for toys, clothes, and other goods on the basis of brands, learning to
argue with parents while preschoolers for particular expensive purchases, and
desiring certain goods at increasingly younger ages.49 There is, of course, an
initial debate over the nature of the good related to this desire, and there are
models of arguments both affirmative and negative on both sides of the
debate.
The commercial side might argue negatively that it is wrong for children
to be deprived of the consumer goods of their choice. The corresponding
affirmative claim might be that it is better for a child to become an active
consumer as early as possible, promoting an engaged development of
consumerism, and that this will allow the child to express a choice for the
goods and clothes the child wishes to be provided.5
47. For the idea that legal perfectionism requires the clear articulation of the moral
notions that the state seeks to encourage in its citizens, see Sheppard, supra note 16.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
49. The marketing of products to infants, particularly through educational media, is
studied in a growing literature on the commercialized child. See, e.g., JULIET B. SCHOR, BORN
To Buy: THE COMMERCIALIZED CHILD AND THE NEW CONSUMER CULTURE (2004); ALEX
MOLNAR, GIVING KIDS THE BUSINESS: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
(1996). For recent illustrations of the broader argument that schools are simply training grounds
for capitalist roles, see DERON BOYLES, AMERICAN EDUCATION AND CORPORATIONS: THE FREE
MARKET GOES TO SCHOOL (2000).
50. While not supported precisely by such arguments, the commercialization ofchildren
is surely a process deliberately provoked by corporate marketing toward children. See, e.g.,
GENE DEL VECCHIO, CREATING EVER-COOL: A MARKETER'S GUIDE TO A KID'S HEART (1997);
MARTIN LINDSTROM & PATRICIA B. SEYBOLD, BRANDCHILD: REMARKABLE INSIGHTS INTO THE
MINDS OFTODAY S GLOBAL KIDS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH BRANDS (2003). Particularly,
see ANNE SUTHERLAND & BETH THOMPSON, KIDFLUENCE : THE MARKETER'S GUIDE TO
UNDERSTANDING AND REACHING GENERATION Y-KIDS, TWEENS AND TEENS (2003). Not
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The counter-commercial argument could claim negatively that it is
wrong to subject children to early commercialization, when they lack the tools
of informed choice against their own personal view of themselves. The
affirmative counter-commercial argument, thus, is that it is better for the child
to remain commercially naive-to play and grow with the tools adults provide
at a pace set by the children's interaction with their physical and social
environment rather than by marketing."
I will skip the traditional four-square grid to compare these approaches,
leaving the reader to consider whether there is more or less in the arguments
for either side, phrased in either mode. While I personally think that
marketing to children and aging them prematurely is wrong, I think the reason
it is wrong is not as much because of the marketing, as because it interferes
with the affirmative good of the child's independent development of
preferences and aesthetics.
I also think that someone arguing in the negative mode for both the
commercial and the noncommercial arguments is less likely to be treating the
child as an end but more likely to be treating the child merely as a means: in
the commercial argument as a means of selling more goods, and in the
counter-commercial argument as a means of restricting interference with
adults. It is equally likely that a sham underlies the affirmative commercial
argument, when it is made, but such arguments appear to me to be more rare.52
Comparing the affirmative models, I would argue, is not only preferable
but so much to be preferred that officials should be required to debate
arguments framed in such modes of rhetoric. They are more likely to be
judged on their merits rather than by balance against actions that would be
rejected by negative models that include their conduct. Affirmative claims are
more easily compared and sorted by priority.53 Affirmative claims are the
pausing to consider the effects of labeling infants as"kids" or adoiscent as "tweens," Sutherland
and Thompson unabashedly describe the effect they labelled "KAGOY," or "kids are getting
older, younger." Id. at 40. Apparently untroubled by the effect of marketing in generating the
effect, they continue to illuminate methods to market to the even younger, including marketing
through schools, encouraging children to nag parents for expensive family goods, like cars, and
training children in the habits of future consumers. Id. at 109, 113-29, 129. For a discussion
of attempts to organize a backlash against such marketing, see NAOMI KLEIN, No LOGO 195-420
(2002).
51. Arguments both negative and positive in this vein are raised in SUSAN LINN,
CONSUMING KIDS: THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER OFCHILDHOOD (2004), and SCHOR, supra note 49.
52. Indeed, arguing to prefer an affirmative approach to the commercial position may
make such shams harder to detect. Frankly, I am not sure what to make of this possibility,
although I suspect with no evidence that it is likely that sham arguments will be made more
often in the negative.
53. For example, Professor Frank Ravitch has kindly reminded me in discussions during
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more readily implemented. If successful, they are more capable of
institutional commitments that are flexible in the light of new understandings
of competing models. Most importantly, it is more likely to be clearly
articulated in a manner that makes clear what moral requirement or other ideal
of the good is at stake-what it is that the child ought to be held to do. Such
an articulation both allows a clearer debate and increases the likelihood that
the child-not the adult-will be the real object of the law, and that the idea of
the good enshrined in the law will be comprehensible to those bound to obey
it.
54
Beyond debate, affirmative arguments are more prone to agreement than
are negative arguments. A fine example of this is the agreement between
Majorie Heins and Professor Bradley Greenberg in their comments at this
symposium. They agree that affirmative media teaching, while hard to
achieve, is a useful corrective to the influence of commercial television."
This agreement contrasts nicely with their general disagreements over value
of negative models of childhood exposure to violence and other ideas, from
which Greenberg favors a degree of censorship and Heins does not.56
In the case of children particularly, there is an additional basis for
preferring affirmative models of the good when framing social and legal
norms. The fact that a child is developing and will, in that process,
experiment with the forbidden suggests that a focus upon the forbidden, rather
than an emphasis on the affirmed, will be less successful. Yet, I think, most
compellingly, affirmative reasons leave less room for aggrandizing arguments
that are not genuinely made in the interests of the child.
this symposium that the perennial debates over the teaching of evolution have become more
nuanced and interesting in a democratic system with the advent of the counter-punch of
intelligent design, an affirmative model that is a better comparative argument than the simple
rejection of the evidence of evolution. Still, this greater balance does not mean that rational
choices cannot be made between these affirmative claims. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt,
Establishing Religious Ideas: Evolution, Creationism, and Intelligent Design, 17 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 321 (2003).
54. The perfectionist requirement that the law make clear the moral notions that the
state seeks to encourage in its citizens is discussed in note 43 supra. This argument is even
stronger in the case of rules affecting the moral understanding, or any form of the good in
children. The structure of rules or other subordinate norms necessary to implement a way of life
for a child are almost always directed to those who are responsible for a child's development,
rather than to the child directly.
55. See Marjorie Heins, Do We Need Censorship to Protect Youth, 2005 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 795; Bradley S. Greenberg & Sarah F. Rosaen, Television and Young People: Violence,
Sex, Booze, and Greed, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 857.
56. See Heins, supra note 55; Greenberg & Rosaen, supra note 55.
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IV. THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE PARENT AND THE PERFECTIONIST
STATE: WHY OFFICIALS MAY PROMOTE THE BASIC INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD
What is so good for the child to know or to value that the law should
require it? The literature over the interest of children is large and growing,
but its general consensus is that all decisions regarding children must be based
on their best interest. As usually formulated, this is a narrow question of
whether a parent can provide economic security.
There is a broader concept of the best interests of the child, one that is
closer to the comprehensiveness of an affirmative model of the best child. It
is the concept of interest developed by Ian Shapiro, a political scientist, which
incorporates a notion of basic interest with the idea of best interests. The
basic interests are those that are in common among all children, a list Shapiro
recognizes as highly controversial, but that he believes can be ascertained by
resort to a process like John Rawls' political justice, which seeks consensus
on political and not metaphysical grounds." His ideal of the basic interests
of the child to be assured by the state is that each child should develop the
"capacities required to function adequately and responsibly in the prevailing
economic, technological, and institutional system."58
Shapiro has argued for a model of power sharing between the state and
the parent which is quite compelling. 9 He adopts John Locke's idea of a
parent as the fiduciary of a child, rather than its owner, and balances a state
interest within a concept of co-fiduciaries.60 In Shapiro's model, the state is
the primary guarantor of the basic interests of each child, while the parent is
the primary guarantor of the best interests of each child.61 The parents remain
responsible for identifying and developing the best interests, "the full
development of every ... child's potential. 62
Shapiro is confident that identifying the best interests is a pluralist
enterprise, but he argues that identifying basic interests is not pluralist,
because that identification is inherently objective, a product of reason and
democratic appraisal. 63 Leaving parents to be custodians of best interests is
57. See RAWLS, supra note 19.
58. IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE 86 (1999).
59. See id. at 70.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 86.
62. Id. at 85-86.
63. Seeid. at 90-91.
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both efficient, in leaving the greater cost to individuals, and wise, by leaving
specific choices to the adults who know and love the child best.64
A practical difficulty emerges here for Shapiro's approach. Although the
process of identifying basic interests may be non-pluralist because it is
rational, that assertion hardly counters the many people who disagree while
claiming rational bases for their position .65 This problem is confounded by the
very nature of the disagreements considered so far in this article, in which the
clash is between views, at least some of which are based on faith in religion.
In sorting through such disagreements, the democratic enterprise is at
least a potential solace.66 In that process, certain forms of religious argument
are limited in the manner in which they are employed, if not in arguing for a
result by citizens, at least in reaching a result by officials.67 There are many
tools to employ in identifying the basic interests of children, including
discussion and debate in a democratic framework, but also looking to tools
that cross social boundaries that are in themselves the product of prior debate.
This last approach is particularly interesting if we are to take Shapiro's belief,
that basic rights are objective, to mean that they can be universally recognized,
or understood without being framed in a particular culture.68
V. HOW TO IDENTIFY BASIC INTERESTS: TEST CASES FOR EDUCATION
One tool for identifying basic interests is to determine those interests that
are considered among many cultures to be necessary for the good of the child.
An example is Article 29 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child:
1. States Parties agree that the education of the child shall be directed to:
64. See id. at 85-86.
65. See HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT, supra note 45.
66. Indeed, the democratic enterprise is particularly well-suited for arbiting such
disagreement through the legislative process. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT
(2001); JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999).
67. This result in the United States is in part derived from the interplay between the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. It is also the principle or moral obligation that results
from debate from religious ground not accessible to others not sharing a similar belief. See
KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); KENT
GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1994); Kent Greenawalt, Religion
and American Political Judgments, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 401 (2001).
68. At least one limit suggests that Shapiro's view of objective basic rights is more
contingent than universal: time. His objective view must be one that can be formed in the
present. It is a rational enterprise, inevitably contingent on the limits of rational conclusion that
can be supported in a given human society. Thus, arguments for the goods of slavery or of the
destruction of monsters would presumably now be rejected as objectively not rational, or not
politically acceptable on objective grounds, even if at one time people who were considered
rational accepted such arguments.
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(a) The development of the child's personality, talents and mental and physical
abilities to their fullest potential;
(b) The development of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
and for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations;
(c) The development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural
identity, language and values, for the national values of the country in which
the child is living, the country from which he or she may originate, and for
civilizations different from his or her own;
(d) The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the
spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship
among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of
indigenous origin;
(e) The development of respect for the natural environment.
69
If we were to apply that standard, then we ought to argue for an
affirmative model for a standard of educational attainment that should be
promoted by the state. There are controversies inherent in all. Values such
as nonviolence can be attacked as counter-productive for tomorrow's soldiers
or corporate managers. Ideas such as promoting a scientific basis for public
health may be attacked as contrary to religion or proper rearing of a moral,
abstinent child. One manner for reducing such conflicts is to narrow the scope
of the idea or value asserted as part of the basic values.
Let us take the example of education as presented in Article 29 as a test
case, and then select further examples in a sufficiently narrow scope, to assess
the utility of particular ideas or values inherent in the example. In other
words, let us consider two examples of minimally controversial forms of the
data and values every child ought to learn pursuant to Article 29.
As an example of such a datum, let me suggest an idea that would surely
fall within the scope of Article 29(a), the germ theory of disease.7" As an
example of such a value, let me suggest one from Article 29(d), the
importance of tolerance and nonviolent engagement with competing ideas.
The officials of a perfectionist state might well determine that it is good that
69. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (Nov. 20, 1989). The United States of America
signed the treaty in 1995, but has not ratified it. The other state that has not ratified this treaty
is Somalia. For background and comparison with an important and successful example of a
convention built on negative models (the Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate
Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, ILO No. 182, (adopted June
17, 1999)), see David M. Smolin, A Tale of Tivo Treaties: Furthering Social Justice Through
the Redemptive Myths of Childhood, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 967 (2003).
70. Granted, this label for the microbial origins of many diseases is antiquated, but it
is still widely recognized. For an accessible new history on Louis Pasteur, Robert Koch, Joseph
Lister, and company, see JOHN WALLER, THE DISCOVERY OF THE GERM: TWENTY YEARS THAT
TRANSFORMED THE WAY WE THINK ABOUT DISEASE (2003).
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every child learn the germ theory. Also, perfectionist officials might
determine that is good that every child be taught the value of tolerance.7 At
this level of specificity, the idea of education is affirmatively presented,
subject to debate, and subject to ready implementation. Both examples
suggest the feasibility, and (I should hope) the desirability of the state's
promotion of the good of education in these specifics.
VI. APPLYING THE TEST CASE AT HOME: DOES THE UNITED STATES
ENSURE THE BASIC INTEREST OF EDUCATION?
Interestingly, the United States does not really assure that all its children
will be educated to know the germ theory or tolerance. What makes this of
special interest is that there is no essential difference between the idea or the
value in their lack of security in the education of every American child. The
laws of the United States do not require all of its children to be educated to
any specific standard.
As we generally perceive the law regulating families and children, the
state is in the role of social insurer. The state sets thresholds for support and
education that a child must receive and for the threat or harm that a child may
not suffer. So long as the parent exceeds neither limit the state will not
usually intervene in their raising of a child.7
Indeed, the Federal Constitution can be invoked as the source of a
parent's right to be free from such interference. As Martha Minow has
proclaimed, a parent has a unique constitutional right "to control another
person."73 The First Amendment's rights of free speech and free association,
the right of privacy, the Ninth Amendment, are all planks in an important
bulwark against the state's intrusion into the sanctity of the hearth. Construed
in the cases and legislation following Pierce, the First Amendment has
actually left a sizeable portion of American students isolated from any
required education of basic interests.
Three decades ago, the balance between parents and state established in
Pierce was developed further by the U.S. Supreme Court, tipping farther
toward the parents, recognizing a right of Amish parents to keep their children
from any education at all after the eighth grade.74 Twelve years ago, the
71. It is not essential here to determine whether the child might be taught competing
ideas; for the moment we can test the theory with successful education of these two.
72. See Martha Minow, Pluralisms, 21 CONN. L. REV. 965, 969 (1989) (stating that
parental control of children is "the nearly universal exception from self-determination under the
Constitution").
73. Martha Minow, Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1353 (1980).
74. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-35. Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder are analyzed in KEVIN W.
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Michigan Supreme Court tipped the balance further, holding that any parents
who engage in home-schooling for religious reasons are exempt from all state
teacher certification requirements.7 5
In each of these cases, the courts were confronted with a specific
circumstance but in common among them all was whether a regulation,
created by the state to ensure that all its children received a particular aspect
of a common education, conflicted with the claim of a parent. In Meyer, the
Nebraska statute requiring English instruction interfered with a teacher's right
to teach a child German.76 In Pierce, Oregon's requirement to attend public
school interfered with a parent's right to send a child to Catholic schools (and
the school's right to teach children).77 In Yoder, the Supreme Court ruled that
the Wisconsin law that children attend school until age sixteen interfered with
the Amish Mennonite parent's right to raise children after the eighth grade in
the traditional crafts and religion, safe from corruption by the world outside
the Amish community.
In each case, the complaining parents or schools were part of long-
established communities, with goals that were compatible in some degree with
a majority ethic of American ideals. Yet, the resulting scope of this
constitutional exemption from educational standards on religious grounds
encompasses a host of alternatives that do not, and these alternatives are
increasingly likely to be manifest in some children's lives.
Today, roughly ten percent of American children receive private
education, and roughly two percent are home-schooled. While the
overwhelming majority of these schools and home-schooling parents are
superb in preparing their charges, the effect of the protections of these
SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT 91-95 (2003). For Yoder,
specifically, see Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53
(1999).
75. See People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1993). The Michigan courts are
not the only state courts to reach this conclusion. See, e.g., Lawrence v. South Carolina State
Bd. of Educ., 412 S.E.2d 394 (S.C. 1991) (striking state requirements of high school diploma
and education exam for home-schooling parents).
76. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
77. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
78. In 2001-2002, private school enrollment was over 5.3 million. See S.P.
BROUGHMAN & K.W. PUGH, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN
THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2001-2002 PRIVATE SCHOOL UNIVERSE SURVEY
(2004), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/2005305.pdf The number of children home-
schooled the following year was 1.1 million. DANIEL PRINCIOTTA & STACEY BIELICK, U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., 1.1 MILLION HOMESCHOOLED STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2003
(2004), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2004/2004115.pdf The development of the home-
school movement is chronicled in CHRISTOPHER J. KLICKA, HOME SCHOOLING: THE RIGHT
CHOICE: AN ACADEMIC, HISTORICAL, PRACTICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (2001).
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enterprises, coupled with either economic and institutional limits or libertarian
impulses, leads to a lack of supervision in nearly half of the states, particularly
for the over one million home-schooled children.79
Ten states allow parents complete autonomy; there is not even a state
requirement for parents to initiate any contact with state school officials to
notify them of a child being home-schooled.8 ' Fourteen states have minimal
regulation, requiring parents only to notify state officials of the child being
home-schooled." Sixteen states have moderate regulation, requiring parents
to notify school officials of children being home-schooled, and to provide
officials with test scores or other professional evaluations of the child's
progress.82
Just thirteen states have involved regulation requiring official evaluation
of each child not in public, or regulated private, schools.8 3 These states
require parents to send notification, achievement test scores, or professional
evaluation, plus other requirements ensuring some exposure to a standard
curriculum.84
Given the scope of the isolation now likely, we must consider the
dangers both to children and to others posed by its more eccentric
manifestations.85 There are defenders of the idea of allowing parents to isolate
their children from state-set basic interests.86 While not considering the
problem directly, David Herring, former dean of the law school of the
University of Pittsburgh, has developed the idea of the family as an essential
79. The reduction in regulation of home-schooling families is a goal for many in the
home-schooling movement, particularly the Home School Legal Defense Association, which
led the fight in the DeJonge case. CHRISTOPHER J. KLICKA, HOME SCHOOL LEGAL DEFENSE
ASs'N, HOME SCHOOLING IN THE UNITED STATES: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (2000).
80. These states include Alaska, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, Michigan,
Indiana, and New Jersey. See Statutes Collected by the Home School Legal Defense
Association, http://www.hslda.org/laws/default.asp (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
81. These states include Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Kansas, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
See id.
82. These states include Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, Ohio, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia. See id.
83. These states include Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma,
New York, Rhode Island, North Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Texas, Washington, and West
Virginia. See id.
84. See id.
85. One danger that has long been known is that there is a correlation between isolation
of families from their communities and child abuse. See Judith G. McMullen, Privacy, Family
Autonomy, and the Maltreated Child, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 569, 589-92 (1992).
86. Not the least, of course, are the advocates for the Home School Legal Defense
Association.
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structure to promote social pluralism through diverse power structures to its
logical extreme. 7 He defends a model of associational tolerance in the
family, in which the mere existence of families contrary to the general norm
provides a model of associational tolerance by officials, which is an object
lesson of some value.
88
Although his model is not unlimited-Herring writes approvingly of state
interference with a parent when the child is physically at risk-he remains
convinced that the family must be given greater tools to defend its political
integrity against a therapeutic state, which has argued for children's rights as
a basis for intruding in the parent-child relationship. 9 This intrusion, he
argues, has weakened the ability of the family to act as a public institution, a
balance against state power.90
Broad views of pluralism such as Dean Herring's include the possibility
that parents will choose to reject the specific notions of germ theory and
tolerance. Indeed, it is not at all hard to imagine a private school or home-
schooling parent who does not teach the values of tolerance. For that matter,
the largest reason for parents' home-schooling is to teach values and
religion.9' Many parents turn to home schools for religious reasons, and it is
a popular choice for evangelical Protestants. 92
Although many religious home-schooling parents no doubt teach the
germ theory well and thoroughly, there is no reason to believe that every
home-schooled child will learn it.93 The germ theory of disease is not in the
87. DAVID J. HERRING, THE PUBLIC FAMILY: EXPLORING ITS ROLE IN DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY (2003).
88. See id. at 7-33.
89. See id. at 20-33.
90. Id. at 36-38, 160-61.
91. Thirty percent of home-schooling parents cite the instruction of religion or moral
values as their primary reason for home-schooling their children. See Princiotta, supra note 78.
This was second only to a general concern over the "environment" of public schools. See id.
92. See, e.g., DOUGLAS WILSON & MARVIN OLASKY, EXCUSED ABSENCE: SHOULD
CHRISTIAN KIDS LEAVE PUBLIC SCHOOLS? (2001).
93. This is not a completely hypothetical example. For example, a mother, who lost
custody of her children owing to mental illness and neglect, also claimed that her children did
,'not need to be taught the A-B-C's or the 1-2-3's because they will only need things that are
revealed to her, [being the mother,] as being needed in due time by her understanding of God's
word.' In re Ephraim L., 862 A.2d 196, 198 (R.I. 2004). The policy being promoted here is
merely one of exposure to knowledge of microbial bases for disease, without the more invasive
claims arising in the related problem of parents and children refusing vaccinations on religious
grounds, yet at least some of these refusals suggest the strength of religious rejections to the
idea. See McCarthy v. Ozark Sch. Dist., 359 F.3d 1029 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding religious
objections to Hepatitis-B vaccination requirement for public school to be mooted by
incorporation into statutory exception).
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Bible, although the divine instigation of plagues is.94 Whether or not we like
to think of it, the work of Louis Pasteur and Joseph Lister are less likely to be
taught by a fundamentalist parent than the theory that illness is the work of
demons, or that faith is the basis of health.9
While state regulation of private schools is generally more scrupulous
about curriculum, no standard exists that would encompass tolerance, and
indeed it is not hard to imagine schools or parents being ideologically opposed
to the tolerance of alternative viewpoints. The white-flight academies of
northern cities and the American South were hardly centers for teaching
tolerance of progressive views.96 Indeed, although the growing movement of
private schools for Islamic students is scrupulous in integrating Western
science and American civics, including traditional Muslim values of
tolerance,97 there is no reason to expect that every Wahabbi school would
teach tolerance of Christianity. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that
Christian schools or parents would teach tolerance of Islam.9
As some now read the First Amendment, a parent is fully empowered to
control a child's thoughts, including whether the child ever learns of bacteria
or toleration. This power amounts to a form of intellectual slavery, allowed
because of a religious justification.99
94. See, e.g., Lev. 13:3,5,30; 1 Kings 8:37. The angel of death is impliedly in Egypt
at Ex. 11:4, 5, 12:29, 30. The angel of death, of course, is important in various religious
traditions with contemporary significance, known as mal'akh ha-mavet in rabbinic tradition,
Izra'il to Sufis, and Azra'il to Sunnis and Shia.
95. See, e.g., Mt. 12:22-24. The preference for healing by faith rather than through
medicine is most often associated with the writings of Mary Baker Eddy. See MARY BAKER
EDDY, SCIENCE AND HEALTH WITH KEY TO THE SCRIPTURES (Christian Science Bd. of Dirs.
1994) (1875).
96. Although there has been some controversy over the degree to which desegregation
led to urban white-flight nationwide, there is no doubt that in the South, as in some Northern
cities, new private segregated schools were created for the purpose of teaching white students
leaving the public schools. Compare Reynolds Farley, Toni Richards & Clarence Wurdock,
School Desegregation and White Flight: An Investigation of Competing Models and Their
Discrepant Findings, 53 SOC. OF EDUC. 123 (1980), with Kenneth T. Andrews, Movement-
Countermovement Dynamics and the Emergence of New Institutions: The Case of "White
Flight" Schools in Mississippi, 80 SOC. FORCES 911 (2002). There has been little academic
study of the curriculum ofthose schools, but I can state with confidence as a child in Mississippi
in the 1970s, few academies were known for tolerance of progressive views regarding race.
97. In 2005, there were 2,400 students in full-time Islamic schools in the New York
City area alone. Susan Sachs, Muslim Schools in the U.S., a Voice for Identity,
http://www.islamfortoday.com/newyorkschools.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2005).
98. See, e.g., Yacovelli v. Moeser, 324 F. Supp. 2d 760 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (parents
and student claiming a university requirement to read a book positively portraying Islam
violated their religious beliefs).
99. 1 am grateful to wordsmith Christine Sheppard for this phrase.
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Despite the statutory allowance of such an extreme result in so many
states, this reading of the First Amendment is extreme and unnecessary. 00
There are three bases in the First Amendment for rejecting this form of
intellectual slavery: (1) the inherent limit of the parent's religious exercise
when it interferes with a compelling state interest promoted by narrow means,
(2) the right of the child to speech, and (3) the barrier on state establishment
of the church.
The U.S. Supreme Court's current jurisprudence does not suggest that
the parent's religious and speech rights to control the development of the child
would trump these interests. Indeed, although it is unconstitutional for a law
to specifically ban a religious rite,'' since Yoder, the Court in Smith declared
that states may promote legitimate interests that incidentally burden the
exercise of religion.
0 2
100. "[P]arents simply do not have a constitutional right to control each and every aspect
of their children's education and oust the state's authority over that subject." Swanson v.
Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. -L, 135 F.3d 694, 699 (10th Cir. 1998). See also State v.
DeLaBruere, 577 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1990) (holding that reasonable regulation of a home-school
does not infringe a parent's rights).
101. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993) (striking down city ordinance banning animal sacrifice in the city limits, when the city
had obviously acted primarily to ban the religious practice). The facts are set out briefly in id.
at 525-31, and more fully in DAVID O'BRIEN, ANIMAL SACRIFICE & RELIGIOUS FREEDOM:
CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI BABALUAYE V. CITY OF HIALEAH (2004).
102. "[Olur cases establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of
general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law
has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice." Church of the Lukumi,
508 U.S. at 531 (citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990)). As Justice Scalia wrote in Smith, religious belief does not excuse an individual from
general laws.
We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance
with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. On
the contrary, the record of more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence
contradicts that proposition. As described succinctly by Justice Frankfurter in
Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 594-595 (1940):
"Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious
toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the
promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious
convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not
relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities (footnote omitted)."
We first had occasion to assert that principle in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S.
145 (1879), where we rejected the claim that criminal laws against polygamy could
not be constitutionally applied to those whose religion commanded the practice.
"Laws," we said, "are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.... Can a
man excuse his practices to the contrary because ofhis religious belief? To permit this
would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the
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The degree to which the state may burden religious interests remains
highly contested, and the new standard upholding neutral laws of general
application that incidentally burden religious practice may not survive
forever.'0 3 If the Smith rule were to fall, the prior rule applied in Yoder and
land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." Id. at
166-167.
Subsequent decisions have consistently held that the right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a "valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (orprescribes) conduct that
his religion prescribes (or proscribes)." United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252, 263 n.
3 (1982) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); see Minersville School Dist. Bd. of
Ed. v. Gobitis,... [310 U.S. 586] at 595 (collecting cases).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79. Justice O'Connor was unmoved by this recitation of precedent.
The Court attempts to support its narrow reading of the [Establishment] Clause by
claiming that "[w]e have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him
from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free
to regulate." Ante, at 878-879. But as the Court later notes, as it must, in cases such
as Cantwell and Yoder we have in fact interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to forbid
application of a generally applicable prohibition to religiously motivated
conduct. Indeed, in Yoder we expressley [sic] rejected the interpretation the Court
now adopts:
..... to agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject to the broad
police power of the State is not to deny that there are areas of conduct protected by
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the
State to control, even under regulations of general applicability ..
Id. at 895-96 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
103. There is considerable support, though, for the Smith approach. See, e.g., Richard
F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the General
Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850 (2001). The most compelling argument
to the contrary seems to me to be Philip Hamburger's but powerful essay against balancing free
exercise rights against governmental interests. See Philip Hamburger, More is Less, 90 VA. L.
REV. 835 (2004). Still, even Hamburger's argument for unconditional free exercise is an
argument to protect its exercise through belief, worship, and professions or sentiments, both
from direct interference and discriminatory laws. This form of exercise was unconditional
precisely because it was defined short of all acts that would intrude into the civic domain. It is
not clear that a requirement that a child be taught certain ideas and values as a civic obligation,
as long as the child otherwise may worship, believe, or think in other ways, interferes with such
exercise.
For the moment, Smith remains good law, despite hostility from some on the Court and from
the Congress. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which would have required the courts
to protect religious practices against state burdens that are not based on compelling state
interests achieved though the least burdensome means, was found unconstitutional, and a zoning
barrier to a church enlargement was upheld, under the Smith standard. See City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
While the Court did not directly reaffirm the Smith test in its most recent establishment case,
the seven-two majority reached a result more consonant with it than with the pre-Smith cases.
See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004).
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before could still be met if the state obligation in issue is a compelling
interest, pursued by the least burdensome means. No Supreme Court case has
yet been brought against a regulation of home-schools and private schools that
require assurance that a student is being exposed to a required curriculum.
Granted, in 1972, the Yoder Court held that the state's interest in
education after the eighth grade was trumped by a religious parent's interest
in isolating the child from outside influence."0 4 Yet the Yoder case did not
overturn the state's power to set a standards for education, only a requirement
to attend a public high school."0 5 Under Yoder's compelling interest
requirement, a state's interest in ensuring a student's knowledge of certain
facts and values would be a sufficient interest that it could be promoted over
the objection of a religious parent or school, so long as it was promoted by the
least burdensome means that are available and sufficient.1 06 So, even under
Yoder's repudiated high standard for the protection of a parent's interest, the
First Amendment does not bar a state from requiring specific aspects of
education for all its children, whether home-schooled or in private schools.' 07
The State's interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is substantial and the
exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden on Promise Scholars. If any
room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be here. We need not venture
further into this difficult area in order to uphold the Promise Scholarship Program as
currently operated by the State of Washington.
Id. at 725.
104. See id. at 219.
105. See id. at 208. See particularly note 3, in which the state in that case rejected an
offer by the community of parents to establish an educational system that would meet state
requirements. See id. at 208 n.3. The problem in Yoder was not the content of the education
but, as in Pierce, whether the state could defend a monopoly on its provision.
106. See, e.g., Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding
achievement test for home-school, despite burden on religion); State v. Anderson, 427 N.W.2d
316 (N.D. 1988), cert. denied, Anderson v. North Dakota, 488 U.S. 965 (upholding teacher
certification requirement); Lawrence v. South Carolina State Bd. ofEduc., 412 S.E.2d 394 (S.C.
1991) (upholding reasonable standards on home-school providers); Hubbard by Hubbard v.
Buffalo Indep. Sch. Dist., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (upholding test on transfer
from religious school to public school); Brunelle v. Lynn Pub. Sch., 702 N.E.2d 1182 (Mass.
1998) (upholding curricular plan, but finding required inspection visits unreasonable).
107. Of course, the First Amendment would bar a state from requiring religious
education or the affirmative rejection of the idea of religion, a point that, taken to an extreme,
is the basis for much of the hue and cry in the debates over "intelligent design." Compare
FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, LAW, DARWINISM, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN (2003) (arguing for intelligent design and
its constitutionality), with NIALL SHANKS, GOD, THE DEVIL, AND DARWIN: A CRITIQUE OF
INTELLIGENT DESIGN THEORY (2004). The argument is chronicled in BARBARA CARROLL
FORREST & PAUL R. GROSS, CREATIONISM'S TROJAN HORSE: THE WEDGE OF INTELLIGENT
DESIGN (2004).
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While the First Amendment creates no bar to educational standards
requiring knowledge of germ theory or the value of tolerance, neither does it
create a duty for officials to create them. Such a duty requires a theory of
laws that would incorporate such a duty, whether upon the state or upon the
officials. To be meaningful in practice, any theory supporting a duty by the
state per se amounts to a corporate duty of its officials.
VII. PERFECTIONIST MUSINGS: WHY THE STATE OFFICIALS OUGHT TO
PROMOTE THE BASIC INTERESTS OF EDUCATION
A perfectionist theory of laws allows an affirmative model of the good
for each child that promotes education, including the specificity needed to
encompass specific facts and values. Returning to the four requirements of
perfectionist theory,"0 8 it is essential to discern a good for the child, distinct
from the parent, in education.
In this case, as in every case of identifying the good, it is controversial.
One formulation, echoing and underpinning the content given in Article 29
above, is Durkheim's ideal of moral education, which would surely justify a
requirement to teach the current understanding of the microbial basis for
disease:
It is in our public schools that the majority of our children are being formed. These
schools must be the guardians par excellence of our national character. They are the
heart of our general education system. We must, therefore, focus our attention on
them, and consequently on moral education as it is understood and practiced in them
and as it should be understood and practiced. As a matter of fact, I am quite sure that
if we bring to our discussion of these questions just a modicum of the scientific
attitude, it will not be hard to treat them without arousing passions and without giving
offense to legitimate feelings....
There are of course many things-in fact, an infinity of things-of which we are
still ignorant. '
09
Durkheim, a Frenchman, may not be persuasive to the modern American
policymaker.
For those not moved by the argument of the French intellectual
Durkheim, let us turn to an Islamic thinker, Kalhil Gibran, who placed a new
poem in the mouth of the prophet, one dealing with children in a manner that
stands nicely against my hypothetical of a potential Wahabbi school
108. See supra Part I1.
109. -MILE DURKHEIM, L' EDUCATION MORALE (1925), reprinted in EMILE DURKHEIM,
MORAL EDUCATION: A STUDY IN THE THEORY AND APPLICATION OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF
EDUCATION 3-4 (Everett K. Wilson ed., Herman Schnurer & Everett K. Wilson trans., 1961).
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encouraging a parent's intellectual slavery of a child to prevent the teaching
of tolerance.
And a woman who held a babe against her bosom said, "Speak to us of Children."
And he said:
Your children are not your children.
They are the sons and daughters of Life's longing for itself.
They come through you but not from you,
And though they are with you yet they belong not to you.
You may give them your love but not your thoughts,
For they have their own thoughts.
You may house their bodies but not their souls,
For their souls dwell in the house of tomorrow,
which you cannot visit, not even in your dreams.
You may strive to be like them,
but seek not to make them like you.
For life goes not backward nor tarries with yesterday.
I 10
Durkheim's model of the French public school is not at issue here, but
his model of the public role of education is, and at this point one sees the
separateness of the child from the parent at the heart of Gibran's
understanding. A private school or a parent might likely be better than a
public school system in instilling not only specific knowledge but the values
of Durkheim's moral education in a given child. To consider the problem of
American home-schooling is not to revisit Pierce or even Yoder. It is, for
Gibran, to protect the child's soul.
Considering how that concept could be manifest in laws allows
numerous possible approaches. Applying such concepts with specificity to
our test cases, there is ample room to argue that state officials may adopt
standards for education of all children to ensure that they are educated on a
variety of specific ideas and values, including the germ theory and tolerance.
Again, the last step is contentious, but I think more easily answered in
favor of the adoption of the law promoting the good of education of specific
facts and values, adopted through a real debate in a democratic institution. No
interests in the parent, whether arising from religion or other beliefs, ought to
be of equal or greater concern to lawmakers than the child's education.
There is no conflict with a constitutional argument for the parent's free
exercise of religion. The parent has no rights greater than the obligation of the
state to ensure the basic interests of the child. Indeed, no parent should be
free to keep a child from ideas that a parent does not like but that a state
recognizes as basic for the child, and for the polity, for the child to learn. The
parent has the right to say that the state is wrong, or the idea is wrong, and to
I 10. KAHLIL GIBRAN, Children, in THE PROPHET 17 (A. Knopf: N.Y. 2004) (1923).
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teach alternative ideas, but this is not the same as keeping the child from an
understanding of the idea itself.
The parent has no right to keep the child in intellectual slavery, and the
religious reasons a parent might try to assert to support such a right are beside
the point. "God wants my child to be stupid" cannot be an argument credited
in the law. The basis in God is not the problem with that argument, the
resulting stupid child is the problem.
There are, of course those who revere the First Amendment or fear the
state so that they would reject such perfectionist notions, trusting the people
to attend to their own interests more than they trust the state. Certainly, we
should be cautious of accepting state views of the "good child." We have, for
example, the illustrations offered in this symposium by Marjorie Heins of
once-accepted standards of the good child, that if adopted by a punctilious
state would have boys' privates wired and belled."'
In this, I suggest we apply Ian Shapiro's standards of basic interests
toward a perfectionist model of the good child," 2 and I believe we would find
a useful controversy for the democratic culture over what those interests are.
In the balance of whom we should allow to set the standards for children, I too
trust the people more than the state, but I don't trust every one of them.
Ill. See Marjorie Heins, Do We Need Censorship to Protect Youth?, 2005 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 795.
112. See SHAPIRO, supra note 58.
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